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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-FACULTY STATUS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR

AcT-NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).

RELATIONS

Yeshiva University (Yeshiva) is a private institution in New York
City. 1 Its full-time faculty enjoys a substantial role in the governance of
the school. Acting collectively, they make recommendations on a broad
range of policy and personnel matters. 2 Their recommendations are al3
most invariably adopted by Yeshiva's administration.
In 1974 the Yeshiva University Faculty Association (Union) petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (Board) for certification of
a bargaining unit composed of Yeshiva's full-time faculty. 4 The
Board found the proposed unit appropriate5 and directed an elec1. Situated on four separate campuses, Yeshiva is composed of more than a dozen undergraduate and graduate schools and programs. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053 & n.l (1975).
2. Recommendations come from various faculty committees, from departmental or schoolwide
meetings of the faculty, or from departmental chairpersons or senior professors acting principally as
spokesmen for the faculty. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686, 690-94, 696 n. 11 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
The subjects over which the full-time faculty exercises recommendatory power are not identical at
all of Yeshiva's several schools. For example, only at Yeshiva's Teacher's Institute for Women has
the faculty influenced a decision regarding the physical location of the school. Id. at 692. Generally,
however, full-time faculty members at most or all of Yeshiva's schools make recommendations on
admissions requirements, curriculum, and other academic policies, and on the hiring, promotion,
and tenure of their full-time and part-time colleagues. Id. at 690-94. The full-time faculty at some of
Yeshiva's schools recommends the level of tuition and the extent of faculty workload and salaries.
Id. A universitywide faculty committee has jurisdiction over faculty grievances and is authorized to
recommend appropriate action to Yeshiva's president. Id. at 694.
3. Id. at 690-94. For example, the dean of Yeshiva's Ferkauf Graduate School testified that he
accepted "98 percent" of the faculty's hiring recommendations. Id. at 693.
4. Id. at 688. The proposed unit embraced "all faculty appointed to the University in the titles
of professor, associate professor, assistant professor, [and] instructor with a full-time teaching load
or the equivalent." Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1018 (1975).
Among those omitted were part-time faculty and faculty at a few of Yeshiva's several schools, including, for example, the medical school. Id.
5. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1057, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1021 (1975). There was one
exception to the Board's approval of the proposed unit. The Union had sought inclusion of faculty
members applying for and administering research grants. The Board found these members to be supervisors and therefore excluded them from the unit. Id. at 1056-57, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1021.
The Board detailed the composition of the approved unit as:
All full-time faculty members appointed to the University in the titles of professor, associate
professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or visiting thereof, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans, but excluding faculty at Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, Sue Golding Graduate School of Medical Sciences, Yeshiva
High School, Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary, Cantorial Training Institute, Community Service Division, and Sephardic Community Activities Program; part-time faculty; lecturers; principal investigators; deans, acting deans and directors; faculty whose initial and subsequent appointment is subject to special funding derived in the main from non-University
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tion. 6 The Union won handily. 7 It was thereafter certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of its members.
Yeshiva, however, refused to bargain. The Board found Yeshiva to be
in violation of the National Labor Relations Act 8 (NLRA) and ordered
it to bargain. 9 Yeshiva's continued refusal to bargain prompted the
Board to petition for judicial enforcement of its order. 10 The petition was
denied on the ground that Yeshiva's faculty are supervisory or managerial employees and thus excluded from the protective ambit of the
NLRA. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
Supervisors and managerial employees were originally excluded from
the NLRA's protections to solve problems caused by the unionization of
decisionmakers working in the hierarchy of business organizations. I"Decisionmaking at Yeshiva, however, as in much of higher education, is
organized on a non-hierarchical, collective basis.' 2 The Yeshiva court
implicitly assumed, despite the University's non-hierarchial decisionmaking structure, that the policies underlying the exclusion of supervisors and managerial employees would be served by denying faculty the
right to bargain collectively. This note tests that assumption. It examines
the extent to which the purposes for excluding supervisory and managerial personnel from the NLRA's protections are served by denying
Yeshiva's faculty the right to form a bargaining unit.
I. BACKGROUND
The NLRA only protects the collective bargaining rights of those who

funds or whose initial or subsequent appointment is in connection with special projects: the
Registrar; visiting professors (with effective faculty appointments at other academic institutions); librarians, research assistants; research associates; emeritus faculty not actively engaged
in teaching at the University; officers of the University; all other administrative and support
personnel; guards, and supervisors as defined in the [NRLA].
Id. at 1057, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1021.
6. Id. at 1057.
7. The vote was 90 to 50 in favor of the Union. Brief for the American Federation of Teachers,
AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 10, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976). An employer's refusal to bargain with the certified representative of its employees constitutes an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (1976).
9. Yeshiva Univ., 231 N.L.R.B. 597, 96 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1977), enforcement denied. NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 1212 (1979).
10. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 689.
11. See note 19 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.

Faculty Collective Bargaining
meet its definition of "employee." ' 13 "[A]ny individual employed as a
supervisor," as the term is defined by section 2(11) of the NLRA,' 14 is
expressly excluded from the protected class of employees.1 5 Although
the NLRA makes no explicit reference to managerial employees, they
have been barred from the NLRA's benefits as a matter of longstanding
Board policy.16 The category of managerial employees embraces those
"who formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and
making operative the decisions of the employer." 17 An alternative, overlapping formula defines as managerial those employees who are closely
18
aligned with or related to management.
The definitions of "supervisor" and "managerial employee" were
initially formulated in response to problems arising from the unionization
of decisionmakers working in the hierarchical authority structure of commerce. 19 They identify employees situated in the middle of the hierarchy,
thus excluding from'the NLRA's protections any individual sandwiched
between the employer above and the rank and file below. But since much
of higher education fails to conform to the hierarchical organization of
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The NLRA's protections are also limited to employees working for
non-governmental employers. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). Thus, the collective bargaining rights of
faculty at public universities are governed by state labor laws.
14. Sectioi 2(11) defines "supervisor" as follows:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
For the most part, § 2(11) calls for a disjunctive reading. NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
405 F.2d 1169, 1173 (2d Cir. 1968); Ohio Power Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1949).
Its conjunctive elements are the exercise of authority in the interest of the employer, the use of independent judgment, and performance of at least one of the listed functions. NLRB v. Security Guard
Serv., Inc., 384 F.2d 143, 147 (5th Cir. 1967).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976). The NLRA does not prohibit the unionization of supervisors or
managerial employees. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). Such unions are, however, denied statutory protection. Id. References herein to faculty unions or faculty unionization are to unions or unionization
within the protection of the NLRA.
16. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 285 (1974); International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 1964).
17. Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4, 21 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1039
(1947).
18. See Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753, 37 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1392(1956).
19. In Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972), the Board observed that
the statutory concept of supervisor was designed to cope with problems in the pyramidal
organizational structure of business. Id. at 648, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1555-56. The managerial employee
exemption was first applied in Vulcan Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 733, 736, 15 L.R.R.M. 66, 67 (1944), a
case clearly involving a hierarchically organized business.
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the business sector, 20 efforts to transplant the definitions of supervisory
and managerial employees into the academic setting have led to conceptual difficulty.

At roughly a quarter of America's universities a mode of governance
exists which has been aptly described as the "shared authority" system. 21 On any given question, primary decisionmaking authority within

this system is vested in one of three groups: the board of trustees, the
administration, or the faculty. 22 Typically, faculty members exercise de-

cisive influence over decisions on such matters as hiring, promotion, and

23
tenure of their colleagues, curriculum, and admissions requirements.

Their decisions take the form of authoritative recommendations and are
usually reached on a collective basis, as by a vote of the faculty senate or
24

a faculty committee.
The management prerogatives of faculty members under the shared authority system would seem to place them squarely within the definitions

of supervisory and managerial personnel. The Board, however, has announced three reasons for its contrary conclusion. The first reason,

25
which has come to be known as the "collective authority" doctrine,
emerged from the Board's initial bout with the question of faculty
unionization. 26 Apparently relying on the reference to "any individual"
in section 2(1 1)'s definition of supervisor, 27 the Board determined that
"the policymaking and quasi-supervisory authority which adheres to

full-time faculty status but is exercised by them only as a group does not
make them supervisors . . . or managerial employees."
20.

See notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra.

21.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION,

28

FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC GOVERN-

15-16 (1967). The medieval origins of the shared authority system are described in McHugh,
Collective Bargaining With Professionals in Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determination,
1971 Wis. L. REV. 55, 63-67.
22. American Association of University Professors, American Council on Education, Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, Statement on Government of Colleges and
ANCE

Universities, 52 AM. A. U. PROFESSORS
BULL. 375 (1966).

23. Id. at 376, 378.
24. See id. at 378-79.
25. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 699.
26. C. W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1971).
The Board's first assertion of jurisdiction over a nonprofit educational institution came in Cornell
Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970), a representation proceeding involving only
nonteaching employees. Following Cornell the Board promulgated a rule that it would assert jurisdiction only over private, nonprofit universities and colleges with gross annual revenues of one million dollars or more. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1978).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976) (emphasis added); see note 14 supra. See also Tusculum
College, 199 N.L.R.B 28, 30, 81 L.R.R.M. 1345, 1347 (1972).
28. C. W. Post Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904,905, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001,1003
(1971) (emphasis added). The collective authority doctrine of C. W. Post was conceived by the
Board without the benefit of argument on the possible status of faculty members as managerial or
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The Board's second reason for extending the NLRA's protections to
faculty is its belief that they exercise their decisionmaking authority in
30
their own interest, 29 not in the interest of their employer.
As a third reason for its conclusion, the Board points to the retention
of ultimate decisionmaking power by the boards of trustees at private
universities. 3 1 According to the Board, this reservation of authority relegates faculty to an advisory role. 32 The Board apparently believes that
such a role does not bestow the authority to "effectively recommend"
33
which is required for supervisory status.
By the time the Board was called upon to determine whether Yeshiva's
faculty could compel bargaining under the NLRA, substantial Board precedent had developed in favor of finding faculty bargaining units appropriate. 34 Yeshiva nevertheless challenged the proposed unit, arguing that
its faculty members were managerial or supervisory employees. 35 The
Board rejected Yeshiva's argument with a well-rehearsed statement of its
three reasons for concluding that faculty are within the NLRA's protected class of employees: "[F]aculty participation in collegial decision
making is on a collective rather than individual basis, it is exercised in
the faculty's own interest rather than 'in the interest of the employer,'
and final authority rests with the board of trustees."36
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
Despite the Board's decision, Yeshiva refused to bargain with its
newly certified faculty union. 37 A subsequent Board order commanding
supervisory employees. Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking
Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 63, 95-101 (1973).
It has been accurately observed that "the Board has tended to blur the distinction between [supervisors and managerial employees] in its treatment of the challenges in [faculty representation]
cases." Finkin, The NLRB in HigherEducation, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 608, 614 (1974).
29. See, e.g., New York Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1148, 1149, 91 L.R.R.M. 1165, 1169(1975).
30. The exercise of authority in the interest of the employer is a prerequisite to supervisory status under § 2(11). See note 14 supra.
31. See, e.g., Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 250, 89 L.R.R.M. 1862, 1867 (1975).
32. Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545, 1556 (1972).
33. Id. Section 2(11) requires that a supervisor at least be empowered to make effective recommendations. See note 14 supra.
34. E.g., Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65, 79 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1972); Fordham Univ.,
193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971); Long Island Univ. (Brooklyn Center), 189 N.L.R.B.
909, 77 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1971).
35. Yeshiva Univ., 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1053-54, 91 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1018 (1975).
36. Id. at 1054, 91 L.R.R.M. at 1018 (footnote omitted). Language identical to that quoted in
the text appears in other Board decisions. E.g., University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 634, 87
L.R.R.M. 1634, 1637 (1974).
37. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
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Yeshiva to bargain was ignored. 38 In denying the Board's petition for enforcement of its order, 39 the Yeshiva court rejected, seriatim, the three
reasons 40 the Board had advanced for overlooking the Yeshiva faculty's

substantial role in university governance. Turning first to the Board's
collective authority doctrine, the court conceded that some ambiguity
was created by inclusion of the words "any individual" in section
2(1 1)'s definition of supervisor. 4 1 Nevertheless, the doctrine was held in-

defensible. The court noted that neither precedent nor legislative history
sanctioned it; 42 indeed, the doctrine had not been followed in several of
the Board's own decisions. 43 But the court did not insist upon its reading

of section 2(11) "since there is no such 'individual' statutory restriction
in the Board's own concept of 'managerial employees.'

"44

The court

could discern no legitimate reason for holding that the collective nature
of faculty decisionmaking bars a finding that faculty members are mana38. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
39. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
40. The court erred in assuming that the Board considered faculty members' status as professional employees to be a fourth independent reason for finding that they are not managerial or supervisory personnel. The NLRA defines "professional employee" as
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as
opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent
exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output
produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of
time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily
acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution
of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an
apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction
and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under
the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee
as defined in paragraph (a).
29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1976). Professional employees are entitled to the NLRA's protections. Id.; id.
§ 157 (1976). The Board has characterized faculty members as professional employees. C. W. Post
Center of Long Island Univ., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1003 (1971). But the
Board certainly has not held that a faculty member's professional status precludes his exclusion as a
supervisor. See note 5 supra. In C. W. Post the Board found department chairpersons to be
supervisors and therefore excluded them from the bargaining unit although the realm of their authority was similar to that of the faculty. 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 906, 77 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1003-04(1971).
The only apparent basis for the differential treatment was the chairpersons' individual, as opposed to
collective, authority to make recommendations. In Fordham Univ., 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 78
L.R.R.M. 1177 (1971), the Board found that department chairpersons acted collectively with the
faculty in making recommendations and therefore included them in the faculty unit. Id. at 137-39,
78 L.R.R.M. at 1181-83. Nevertheless, the Board's holding in C. W. Post shows that despite a
faculty member's professional status he will be excluded as a supervisor if effective recommendatory
authority is vested in him individually and not as part of the collective.
41. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 699.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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gerial employees. 45 Thus, while section 2(11) could conceivably be read
to limit supervisors to those who make decisions on an individual basis,
no such restriction inheres in the Board's definition of managerial em46
ployee.
Rejection of the Board's second reason for allowing faculty bargaining-that faculty members act in their own interest-was predicated on a
finding that the interests of faculty and University are actually "coextensive." 47 The Yeshiva administration's adoption of virtually all faculty recommendations evidenced an identity of interest between faculty
and university-employer that could not meaningfully be separated. This
identity demonstrated to the court "the inapplicability of the 'interest of
the faculty' analysis" in the context of Yeshiva's shared authority sys48
tem.
The reservation of ultimate authority by Yeshiva's trustees was considered a "particularly unconvincing" reason for the Board's decision that
Yeshiva's faculty could compel bargaining under the NLRA. 49 Section
2(11) defines as supervisors those empowered to make effective recommendations, without regard to whether those recommendations are reviewed by a higher authority. 50 The court concluded that "[i]f [the
ultimate review authority of Yeshiva's trustees] is to preclude full-time
faculty members from assuming managerial or supervisory status . . .
then it is difficult to contemplate any situation where the statutory and
Board-created exemptions can be applied.''51
I. ANALYSIS
As the Yeshiva court recognized, a Board determination that an individual is within the NLRA's protected class of employees should be sustained on review if it has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in
the statute. 52 The court concluded that the Board had failed to advance
''any persuasive rationale" for its finding that Yeshiva's faculty are not
supervisory or managerial employees. 53 To this extent, the decision is
correct. 54 Arguably, however, the Yeshiva opinion is flawed by its com45. Id. at 699-700.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 700.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 701.
50. Id. at 701-02.
51. Id. at 702 (emphasis in original).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See notes 63 & 64 infra. See also Note, Full-Time Faculty Held Not To Be "Employees"
Under the National Labor RelationsAct, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 437 (1978). But see Note, The Super-
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plete failure to consider the policies underlying the exclusion of supervisors and managerial employees from the NLRA's protections. In light of
the ambiguity of section 2(1 1)'s definition of supervisors, 55 if excluding
faculty members does not serve any of these policies, a reasonable statutory basis exists for upholding the Board's decision to enforce faculty
bargaining.
The legislative history of section 2(11)56 reveals that its exclusion of
supervisors from the NLRA's coverage serves at least three purposes.
First, it preserves the supervisor's undivided loyalty to his employer by
withdrawing him from a situation where he might face a conflict between
the interests of his employer and the interests of the employees he supervises. 57 Second, it prevents supervisors from dominating the unions of
employees protected by the NLRA. 58 Finally, the exclusion of supervisors ensures a clear line of demarcation between labor and management. 59 The purposes of the managerial exclusion, as delineated by the
Board and the courts, are virtually identical to those underlying section
2(11).60
A. Faculty Unionization and the Problem of Divided-Loyalty
The preservation of supervisors' loyalty dominated the attention of
Congress when, in 1947, it amended the NLRA to include section
2(1 1).61 Congressional concern focused on evidence showing that when

visory Status of Private University Faculty Members Under the NLRA: NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 43 ALB. L. REV. 162 (1978).
55. See note 41 and accompanying text supra. See also Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v.
NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969) (noting the ambiguity in the Board's concept of managerial
employee).
56. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1947), reprinted in SuBCoMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93d CONG., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 409-11 (Comm. Print 1947) [hereinafter cited as HISTORY
1st Sess. 13-17 (1947), reprinted in HISTORY OF ACT at
304-08; H. R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947), reprinted in HISTORYOF
Act at 539-40.
OF ACT]; H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.,

57. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text infra.
58. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text infra.
59. See notes 81-82 and accompanying text infra.
60. See notes 63 & 84 infra.
61. The original version of the NLRA was the Wagner Act of 1935. The Wagner Act contained
no express exclusion for supervisory employees. In 1947, the United States Supreme Court, in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), affirmed the Board's decision that managerial
employees were entitled to bargain under the NLRA. The Packarddecision prompted the enactment
of § 2(1 1)'s supervisory exemption in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
LABOR LAW 1, 33-34 (1976).
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supervisors were allowed to unionize their loyalty divided between the
employer and the workers. When supervisors organize, "even in a union
that claims to be 'independent' of the union of the rank and file, they are
subject to influence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead
of their bossing the rank and file, the rank and file bosses them.'"62 Thus,
unionization meant supervisors were being forced to act in the interest of
the employees beneath them in the business hierarchy, thereby depriving
63
employers of the undivided loyalty to which they are entitled.
In light of this congressional policy behind the exclusion of supervisors, application of section 2(11) requires an employment situation in
which the interests of the employer conflict with the interests of those
employees who are subject to the supervisor's authority. The Yeshiva
court's conclusion that the interests of the faculty and the universityemployer are always coextensive 64 is based on the unexamined assumption that faculty supervision of its own members is not such an employ62. H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), reprinted in HIsroRYoF Act, supra
note 56, at 305. It is important to note Congress' perception of how the rank and file unions were
able to "boss" the unions of their "bosses."
The evidence shows that foremen's unions are, and must be, wholly dependent upon rank-andfile unions and under constant obligation to them. The foremen cannot strike without the support of the rank and file and its agreement not to do the work of striking foremen ...
...[R]ank-and-file unions tell the foreman's union when the foremen may strike and when
they may not, what duties the foremen may do and what ones they may not, what plants the
foreman's union may organize and what ones it may not.
H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1947), reprinted in HISTORY OF AcT, supra note
56, at 306-07.
63. Eliminating the divided loyalty resulting from unionization of management personnel is also
a central purpose of the Board-created exemption for managerial employees. There are two tests of
managerial status. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra. The first test classifies as managerial those employees who are so aligned with management that allowing them to unionize would
open the door to a conflict of interest in labor relations. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of
Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 290 n.20 (1974); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412
F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969). In the interest of simplicity, the divided loyalty problem is discussed
herein only with reference to § 2(1 l)'s exclusion of supervisors. The analysis, however, is also applicable to faculty members' possible status as managerial employees.
This brief sketch of the divided loyalty problem supports the Yeshiva court's rejection of the
Board's collective authority doctrine. The ability of rank and file unions to undermine the loyalty of
supervisors and managerial employees would not be impaired by the happenstance that supervisory
authority is exercised by a group rather than an individual.
64. With one caveat, the court's conclusion that faculty and university-employer share an identity of interest seems correct. It is doubtful that the interests of the particular faculty member being
supervised are identical to those of his faculty supervisors and the university-employer. The supervised member's personal stake in the outcome of any decision directly affecting his future at the
university is sufficient, it would seem, to generate a self-interest divergent from the interests of the
university and its faculty supervisors.
The only decisions on point hold that despite an identity of interest between the employer and
employees with supervisory authority, § 2(1 1)'s exclusion applies. NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440
F.2d 625, 630 (lst Cir. 1971); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 697, 699 (5th Cir.
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ment situation. The interests of faculty supervisors, supervised faculty,
and the university-employer being identical, a conflict of interest is im65
possible.
It seems more accurate, however, to assume that the personal stake of
a faculty member affected by a decision of the supervising faculty will
generate a conflict between the interests of the affected member and the
66
mutual interests of the university-employer and its faculty supervisors.
Once this conflict is recognized, the critical inquiry becomes whether
unionization will cause the supervising faculty to be disloyal to the interests they share with the university-employer. If there is an unequal distribution of power among members of the faculty union, disloyalty seems
possible. Occasions will arise when those at the pinnacles of union power
will be the subjects of faculty supervision. Their disproportionate share
of power in the union may enable them to influence their faculty supervisors to render a decision favorable to them, yet adverse to the interests of
the university-employer.
It is also possible that faculty supervisors' decisions on such matters as
hiring, promotion, and tenure will be influenced by a desire to advance
union interests. An occasional tenure denial as punishment for refusing
to join in a strike, or for other disloyalty to the union, is hardly inconceivable.67
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 903 (1965). Because the divided loyalty problem exists even where
the interests of the employer and supervisor are identical, it is incorrect to argue that. since "'the
protected loyalty is that owed to oneself," fears of "sacrificed faculty loyalty are unrealistic."
Note, A UniversityFaculty With a Record of ManagerialActivity May Be ManagerialPersonneland
Therefore Excluded From The Coverage of The National Labor Relations Act-NLRB v. Yeshiva
University, 13 GA. L. REv. 313, 321 (1978).
65. Section 2(11) excludes only those individuals who supervise "employees." See note 14
supra. The Yeshiva court was aware of the "logical difficulty" of its holding that faculty supervisors
supervise other faculty supervisors. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 699. Unfortunately, the
court's acknowledgment of this ambiguity did not prompt any analysis of policy considerations underlying the apparent requirement that supervisory authority be exercised over the non-supervisory
class of "employees."
66. See note 64 supra.
67. Congress apparently never considered the possibility of unionized supervisors subordinating
their loyalty to the employer to the interests of the union. The legislative history of § 2( 11) reveals
that Congress envisaged only one kind of conflict of interest problem with supervisors' unions-a
conflict between the employers' interests and the interests of the rank and file unions. See notes
62-63 supra. It seems, however, that whether the subordinating influence is exercised by those being supervised or by the union itself is inconsequential. Either way the employer loses the supervisor's undivided loyalty. It is this loss that § 2(11) was designed to prevent. Id.
Because the union itself can be a subordinating influence, the policy of preserving undivided loyalty is served by excluding supervisors where they supervise other supervisors. Therefore, when §
2(11) requires that a supervisor supervise "employees," the word "employees" should be read to
include any persons employed by the employer, including a supervisor. See note 65 supra. Contra,
Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 44 (7th Cir. 1969) ("employees" should
be read to mean "employees" as defined by the NLRA, thus excluding supervisors, but this part of
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Faculty unionization also presents a potential conflict of interest arising out of the full-time faculty's supervision of their part-time colleagues. 6 8 A separate union of part-time faculty, 69 with interests different
from those of the university-employer, could influence unionized fulltime faculty in the same way that unions of the industrial rank and file
70
were able to influence their supervisors.
Several factors reduce the danger that the influence of part-time faculty would divide the loyalty of their full-time faculty supervisors. Aside
from the question whether a part-time faculty union would even be appropriate, 71 it is unclear whether part-time faculty members have the enthusiasm for unionization, 72 the kind of conflicting interests, 73 or the
numerical strength 74 necessary to undermine the loyalty of their faculty
supervisors to the university-employer. Nevertheless, it is impossible to
say with certainty that the danger of divided loyalty is entirely absent. 75
Thus, there inheres in faculty unionization at least the potential for
subjecting faculty supervisors to a conflict between the interests of their
the opinion is dictum and does not consider the special problem of supervisors supervising other
supervisors).
68. "[I]n many of Yeshiva's schools the full-time faculty also supervise collectively the activities of the part-time faculty." NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 699. See also note 2supra.
69. Beginning with its decision in New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549
(1973), the Board has consistently excluded part-time faculty from bargaining units including fulltime faculty.
70. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
71. That question remains open. New York Univ., 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 8 n.12, 83 L.R.R.M.
1549, 1553 n.12 (1973). See also Goddard College, 216 N.L.R.B. 457, 458-59, 88 L.R.R.M.
1228,1230 (1975).
72. Board approval of part-time faculty units is rarely sought. See Head & Leslie, Bargaining
Unit Status of Part-Time Faculty, 8 J.L. & EDuc. 361, 376 (1979).
73. It is not entirely clear that the interests of Yeshiva's part-time faculty conflict with those of
the university-employer and the full-time faculty. See Brief for Respondent at 81-83, NLRB v.
Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978); Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 43,
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1978).
74. Yeshiva's full-time faculty members outnumber the part-time faculty by 209 to 150. NLRB
v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 690.
75. The Board has established a clear-cut rule for resolving the problem of individual faculty
supervision of such persons as part-time faculty members, research assistants, and support personnel. If the faculty member's supervision of non-unit personnel occupies less than 50% of his time,
such supervisory authority does not render him a supervisor. Fordham Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 971,
974, 87 L.R.R.M. 1643, 1648 (1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 645, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545,
1551-52 (1972). The "50% rule" has received at least limited judicial acceptance. Trustees of Boston Univ. v. NLRB, 575 F.2d 301, 306 (1st Cir. 1978). One commentator has spoken in its defense.
Finkin, The Supervisory Status of ProfessionalEmployees, 45 FoRDHAM L. REv. 805 (1977). Not all
members of the Board concede its validity. Fordham Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 971, 978, 87 L.R.R.M.
1643, 1652 (1974) (Member Kennedy, dissenting). The Yeshiva court expressly reserved judgment
on the matter. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 694 n.8. In terms of the policy of § 2(11), the
50% rule is probably indefensible. Whether a supervisor spends 40 or 80 percent of his time supervising would appear to have little or no bearing on the likelihood that he will face a conflict of
interest upon joining a union.
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employer on the one hand, and the interests of their union and their parttime colleagues on the other. Perhaps it is cynical to envisage this conflict leading to an actual reduction in faculty loyalty to the university-employer's interests. Arguably, the faculty's interest in bettering the school
is strong enough to resist the conflicting influences of part-time faculty
and the pressure to advance the interests of the full-time faculty union.
Yet when it comes down to the real life situation-to the moment, for
example, when faculty supervisors must decide whether or not to promote a deserving professor who has obstinately objected to every
proposed union contract-it is impossible to dispel all doubt about the
adverse effect of unionization on faculty loyalty.
B. Faculty Unionization and the Problems of Domination and
Demarcation
Although the primary purpose of section 2(11) is to preserve for employers the undivided loyalty of their supervisors, Congress also expressed a number of subordinate purposes. One of these was to "assure
to workers freedom from domination or control by their supervisors in
their organizing and bargaining activities." 7 6 Although there is little
elaboration on this point in the legislative history of section 2(11), Congress apparently believed that the authoritative positions of supervisors
would enable them unduly to influence, on behalf of the employer, the
rank and file's decisions on union matters. 77 This belief presupposes that
an unequal distribution of decisionmaking power in the workplace carries
over into the union. To the extent that supervisory authority is spread
evenly over university faculty, the fear of domination seems unwarranted. At Yeshiva, however, some faculty members wield more authority than others. This inequality is strikingly exemplified by the participation of some full-time faculty members on hiring and promotion
committees. 78 The small number of full-time faculty members on these
committees have virtually unrestricted authority over matters within their
jurisdiction. Upon unionization, there is a possibility that faculty committee members will use their disproportionate supervisory authority as a
tool to dominate union affairs in the interest of the employer. Similarly,

76.

H. R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), reprinted in HistORy or Acr, supra

note 56, at 305.
77.
78.

NLRB v. Florida Agricultural Supply Co., 328 F.2d 989, 991 (5th Cir. 1964).
NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 691, 693-94.
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if both full-time and part-time faculty unionize, 79 there is a risk that the
former will dominate the latter, for part-time faulty at Yeshiva exercise
80
considerably less supervisory authority than their full-time colleagues.
Another purpose of section 2(11) is to draw a "more definite line between management and labor" 81 and to free employers from any compulsion " to accord to the front line of management the anomalous status of
employees." 82 In Yeshiva's shared authority system, faculty members
play a dual role as managers and employees. When cast in the latter role,
faculty members are not unlike industrial production line workers. The
product of the university is the educated student, and no one works more
closely with that product, handling it on a day-to-day basis, than the faculty. Also, like industrial workers, faculty members have a deep concern
for the quality of their work environment. In the role of managers, however, faculty members act as decisionmakers. They largely determine the
terms and conditions of employment within the enterprise.
This schizophrenic quality inhering in faculty membership makes
unionization of faculty problematic in two respects. First, unionization
blurs the division between labor and management, making it necessary to
draw a somewhat artificial line between the parties to the bargaining process-the faculty employees and the university-employer. The necessity
of clearly differentiating the faculty from the employer for the purpose of
bargaining may engender an adversarial relationship between faculty and
university administrators. 83 Arguably, replacing the cooperative spirit of
the shared authority system with the adversarial quality of collective bargaining will impede the goal of furthering the institution as a house of
learning.
A related problem lies in the anomaly of permitting those in substantial
control of the terms and conditions of their employment to claim the benefit of a statute designed to protect those who would otherwise be
powerless to shape their work environment. The draftsmen of the NLRA
were*concerned with "[the inequality of bargaining power between employees[, who do not possess full freedom of association or actual lib-

79. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
80. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 43, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d 686
(2d Cir. 1978).
81. S. RaP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947), reprintedin HisToRY OF ACT, supra note
56, at 411.
82. Id.
83. A simplistic solution to this difficult problem has been proposed. Walker, Feldman, &
Stone, Collegiality and Collective Bargaining:An Alternative Perspective, 57 Enuc. REc. 119
(1976).

855

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:843, 1979

power is a
erty of contract, and employers."84 Equality of bargaining
85
central attribute of Yeshiva's shared authority system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although expressly limited to its facts, 86 the Yeshiva decision casts an
ominous shadow over the developing phenomenon of faculty collective
bargaining at private universities. 87 The Board's consistent approval of
faculty bargaining units, despite the professoriate's major role in institutional governance, undoubtedly led many faculty members to believe
they had a vested right to engage in bargaining under the NLRA. Nevertheless, the policies supporting the exclusions for managerial and supervisory employees provide ample support for the Yeshiva decision.
James C. Howe

84. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
Similarly, the second test of managerial employee status is aimed at weeding out those who, because of their alliance with the employer, do not need the protections of the NLRA. This second test
deems managerial those employees empowered to determine and effectuate management policies.
See note 17 and accompanying text supra. The exclusion is grounded "on the theory that [managerial employees] were the one[s] from whom the workers needed protection." Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967). This
statement of the exclusion's purpose, though often quoted, has never been further elaborated. See.
e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 288-89 n.16 (1974). It
could, alternatively, be interpreted as expressing a fear that allowing managerial employees the right
to bargain would lead to domination of the workers in their union activities. See notes 76-80 and
accompanying text supra (discussion of the domination problem in the university context).
85. If there is any inequality of bargaining power at Yeshiva it is at least arguable that the faculty wields the larger share. For example, faculty members at Yeshiva's Belfer Graduate School successfully petitioned Yeshiva's President for removal of their dean. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582
F.2d at 693.
86. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 582 F.2d at 696.
87. The latest tally shows that faculty at 77 private universities have opted for collective
bargaining. The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 26, 1978, at 8. The comparable figure for public universities is 523. Id.

